Copelin v. Spirco Inc by unknown
1999 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
7-1-1999 
Copelin v. Spirco Inc 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1999 
Recommended Citation 
"Copelin v. Spirco Inc" (1999). 1999 Decisions. 187. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1999/187 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 1999 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
Filed July 1, 1999 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
No. 98-3309 
 
WAYNE COPELIN 
 
v. 
 
SPIRCO, INC., f/k/a Nasco Inc. 
 
STEPHEN I. GOLDRING, Trustee 
 
       INNOVO GROUP, INC.,* 
       Appellant 
       (Pursuant to Rule 12(a), F.R.A.P.) 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 
(D.C. No. 96-cv-00342J) 
District Judge: Honorable D. Brooks Smith 
 
ARGUED MARCH 9, 1999 
 
BEFORE: MANSMANN, SCIRICA, and NYGAARD, 
Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: July 1, 1999) 
 
       James R. Walsh (Argued) 
       Spence, Custer, Saylor, Wolfe 
        & Rose 
       400 United States National Bank 
        Building 
       P.O. Box 280 
       Johnstown, PA 15907 
        Attorney for Appellant 
 
 
  
       Thomas E. Reilly (Argued) 
       Davis & Reilly 
       437 Grant Street 
       1124 Frick Building 
       Pittsburgh, PA 15219 
        Attorney for Appellee 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
Innovo Group, Inc., the parent corporation of debtor 
Spirco, Inc., f/k/a Nasco, Inc.,1 appeals a District Court 
Order disallowing Innovo from using Innovo stock to satisfy 
a Tennessee state court judgment against it. The District 
Court concluded that the judgment does not fall within 
the terms of Spirco's approved Bankruptcy Plan of 
Reorganization, and that Wayne Copelin, who holds the 
judgment against Innovo, is merely seeking to collect on a 
judgment he holds against a non-debtor. We agree and will 
affirm. 
 
I. 
 
Spirco and Innovo hired Wayne Copelin to serve as 
Spirco's president. Copelin, Spirco and Innovo executed a 
written employment agreement that included a clause 
entitling Copelin to compensation in the amount of 
$100,000 if his employment was terminated for any reason 
other than for cause. Appellants' App. at 99. The 
Employment Agreement did not make Innovo's liability 
contingent upon Spirco's failure to pay. Approximately five 
months later, Spirco terminated Copelin without cause, but 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Spirco and Innovo merged under the terms of Spirco's Plan of 
Reorganization filed with the Bankruptcy Court, with Innovo as the 
surviving corporation. During the course of relevant litigations, Nasco 
changed its name to Spirco. As such, the documents in the record refer 
to both Spirco and Nasco to reflect the name of the company at the 
various stages of the Tennessee State Court and bankruptcy litigation. 
However, for ease of understanding, we will only use the company name 
Spirco to refer to both Spirco and Nasco. 
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did not pay the $100,000 compensation due under the 
contract. 
 
Copelin sued Spirco and Innovo jointly and severally in 
Tennessee state court alleging breach of contract, 
misrepresentation, breach of covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, and promissory estoppel. Spirco filed a voluntary 
petition for relief with the Bankruptcy Court for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania under Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. S 101 et seq., which identified 
Copelin as a creditor holding a disputed claim for $250,000 
under the Employment Agreement. Copelin then filed in 
state court a notice of intention to non-suit Spirco without 
prejudice. The state court dismissed Spirco, but Innovo 
remained a party. Innovo then sought to remove the state 
court action to the Bankruptcy Court for the United States 
District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee under 28 
U.S.C. S 1452(a) claiming that the matter was related to 
Spirco's bankruptcy proceeding then pending in the 
Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. 
Copelin objected and requested that the case be remanded 
to the Tennessee State Chancery Court. 
 
The Tennessee Bankruptcy Court conducted a hearing to 
determine the proper forum and concluded that: (1) 
Copelin's suit had no significant impact on the Spirco 
bankruptcy action; (2) Innovo's only relation to the Spirco 
bankruptcy case was as a non-debtor co-defendant in the 
Copelin action; and (3) no objective of the bankruptcy code 
would be furthered by removing the case to the Bankruptcy 
Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. Innovo did not 
appeal, and the case remained in state court. 
 
Spirco filed an Amended Plan of Reorganization with the 
Bankruptcy Court in the Western District of Pennsylvania. 
A copy of the scheduling order and Amended Plan was 
forwarded to Wayne Copelin c/o his attorney in the 
Tennessee state court action. 
 
The Plan stated that Spirco would receive a discharge 
and the "discharge of the Debtor shall also effect a 
discharge of [Innovo with] respect to all claims against 
Spirco, Inc." Appellee's App. at 23. Further, the Plan 
commanded that "at no time shall [Innovo] be deemed a 
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debtor." Id. The Bankruptcy Court for the Western District 
of Pennsylvania confirmed the Amended Plan which stated 
in relevant part: 
 
       Article II-Specifications of Claims and Interests 
 
        Pursuant to Sections 1122 and 1123(a)(1) of the 
       Bankruptcy Code, the following classes of Claims are 
       designated: 
 
        (H) Class 8 - Class 8 consists of holders of Allowed 
       General Unsecured Claims upon which [Innovo] is 
       liable, by guaranty or otherwise, as established by (a) 
       the entry of a final Order upon motion filed by[Spirco] 
       or Class 8 Claimant, or (b) written acknowledgment of 
       [Innov]. Appellants' App. at 65. 
 
       Article III-Plan of Reorganization 
 
        On the Effective Date of the Plan, [Spirco] shall be 
       deemed merged into its parent corporation, [Innovo], 
       with [Innovo] being the surviving corporation. 
       Therefore, on the Effective Date, [Spirco] will cease to 
       exist as a separate corporate entity and [Innovo] shall 
       incur liability of [Spirco] only as provided for in this 
       Plan. Appellants' App. at 66. 
 
       Article X - Effect of Confirmation; Issuance of Group 
       Common Stock; Vesting of Property; Discharge 
 
       . . . At no time shall [Innovo] be deemed a debtor. 
       [Innovo] shall incur no obligations as a result of such 
       merger except as specifically provided in the Plan. 
 
       D. Upon the Effective Date, [Spirco] shall receive a 
       discharge pursuant to Section 1141 of the Bankruptcy 
       Code. The discharge of [Spirco] shall also effect a 
       discharge of [Innovo] will [sic] respect to all claims and 
       interest against Spirco, Inc. 
 
Appellee's App. at 23. 
 
While confirmation of the Reorganization Plan was 
pending, Innovo filed an Amended Answer to Copelin's state 
court complaint claiming that Spirco was an indispensable 
party to the suit and that the suit should be dismissed 
until Spirco could be properly joined. The state court did 
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not find that Spirco was an indispensable party and Spirco 
did not join the action. Appellants' App. at 129. 
 
Spirco filed a Motion to Classify Claims in the 
Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
alleging that Copelin filed non-bankruptcy litigation against 
Innovo to establish Innovo's liability for Spirco's obligation 
by guarantee or otherwise and that Innovo "denies any 
responsibility to [Copelin] for obligations due and owing by 
the Debtor [Spirco]." Spirco requested that this claim be 
classified as a Class 8 claim if Copelin successfully 
established Innovo's liability for Debtor's obligations. 
Appellants' App. at 77. The Bankruptcy Court for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania ordered that in the event 
Copelin obtained a final order in state court establishing 
Innovo liable for Spirco's obligations, then Copelin would be 
deemed to have an Allowed Class 8 claim. Under the terms 
of the confirmed Amended Plan of Reorganization, Innovo 
could satisfy any Allowed Class 8 claim with payment of 
Innovo stock. 
 
The Tennessee State Chancery Court granted summary 
judgment in favor of Copelin against Innovo for $100,000 
plus costs. The Order stated in pertinent part: 
 
       ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Summary 
       Judgment is hereby granted in favor of the Plaintiff, 
       Wayne Copelin, against the Defendant, Innovo Group, 
       Inc., as to the issue of severance benefits described in 
       Paragraph 9, of that Employment Agreement, dated 
       January 2, 1992, and identified as Exhibit B, to this 
       Complaint filed in this cause, and that the Plaintiff, 
       Wayne Copelin, have and recover of the Defendant, 
       Innovo Group, Inc., the sum of $100,000. 
 
Appellants' App. at 149. 
 
Copelin was given a certificate for 352,113 shares of 
Innovo stock to satisfy the judgment. Copelin's attorney 
returned the stock stating that the judgment against Innovo 
was "for a sum certain of money, not stock." Spirco, as 
merged with and into Innovo, then filed a Motion for 
Enforcement of Discharge Injunction and Terms of 
Confirmed Plan, Together with Request for Finding of 
Contempt and Imposition of Sanctions with the Bankruptcy 
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Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. Spirco 
contended that under the terms of the Amended Plan, 
Copelin's judgment against Innovo in state court could be 
satisfied with Innovo stock. Copelin contested the motion. 
 
The Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania enjoined Copelin from "pursuing Innovo 
Group in any other forum to collect on the debt Innovo 
jointly owes along with [Spirco]." The court found that: (1) 
Innovo was a guarantor or otherwise liable to Copelin based 
on Spirco's obligation to Copelin; (2) the dispute was a core 
proceeding, and therefore the bankruptcy court had 
jurisdiction to enter a final judgment; (3) Copelin had a 
Class 8 claim payable in Innovo stock; (4) the debt owed to 
Copelin "by Debtor" was discharged; (5) Copelin was barred 
from challenging the classification of the judgment against 
Innovo as a Class 8 claim; and (6) the denial of removal by 
the Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Tennessee 
regarding Copelin's state court action s against Spirco and 
Innovo did not bar the reorganized debtor from enjoining 
Copelin's collection efforts. See In re Spirco, Inc., 201 B.R. 
744 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1996). 
 
Copelin appealed the Bankruptcy Court's decision to the 
United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania. The District Court concluded that: (1) 
whether Copelin could execute on the state court judgment 
was a non-core matter related to a case arising under title 
11; (2) Copelin's state court lawsuit was against Innovo, not 
Spirco; (3) Copelin's collection efforts did not involve rights 
created by bankruptcy law; (4) the discharge of Innovo 
under the Amended Plan was limited to "those claims and 
interest against Spirco" and that Class 8 claims included 
only those "upon which [Innovo] is liable, by guaranty or 
otherwise"; (5) there was no evidence that Innovo was a 
guarantor of Spirco; and (6) the preclusive effect accorded 
the orders confirming the Amended Plan and classifying the 
claims by the bankruptcy court was too broad. See In re 
Spirco, Inc., 221 B.R. 361 (W.D. Pa. 1998). 
 
The District Court ordered the Bankruptcy Court to 
recognize the state court judgment against Innovo for 
$100,000 plus costs. 
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II. 
 
A. Jurisdiction 
 
28 U.S.C. S 157 sets forth the jurisdiction of the 
bankruptcy courts. It states in pertinent part: 
 
       (b)(1) Bankruptcy judges may hear and determine all 
       cases under title 11 and all core proceedings arising 
       under title 11, or arising in a case under title 11, 
       referred under subsection (a) of this section, and may 
       enter appropriate orders and judgments, subject to 
       review under section 158 of this title. 
 
       (2) Core proceedings include, but are not limited to- 
 
       (A) matters concerning the administration of the 
       estate; 
 
       . . . 
 
       (I) determinations as to the dischargability of 
       particular debts; 
 
       (J) objections to discharges; 
 
       (K) determinations of the validity, extent, or priority 
       of liens; 
 
       (L) confirmation of plans 
 
       . . . 
 
       (c)(1) A bankruptcy judge may hear a proceeding that 
       is not a core proceeding but that is otherwise related to 
       a case under title 11. In such proceeding, the 
       bankruptcy judge shall submit proposed findings of 
       fact and conclusions of law to the district court, and 
       any final order or judgment shall be entered by the 
       district judge after considering the bankruptcy judge's 
       proposed findings and conclusions after reviewing de 
       novo those matters to which any party has timely and 
       specifically objected. 
 
In sum, as the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District 
of Pennsylvania correctly observed, its jurisdiction extends 
over four types of matters: (1) title 11 cases, (2) proceedings 
that arise under title 11, (3) proceedings that arise in a case 
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under title 11, and (4) proceedings related to a case under 
title 11. See Spirco, 201 B.R. at 748; 28 U.S.C. SS 1334(a), 
(b). We conclude that the Bankruptcy Court had 
jurisdiction because this matter is a "proceeding related to 
a case under title 11." 
 
A proceeding is related to a case under title 11 if it "could 
conceivably have any effect on the estate being 
administered in bankruptcy" such that " `it is possible that 
[the] proceeding may impact on the debtor's rights, 
liabilities, options, or freedom of action or the handling and 
administration of the bankrupt estate.' " Halper v. Halper, 
164 F.3d 830, 837 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting In re Guild & 
Gallery Plus, Inc., 72 F.3d 1171, 1181 (3d Cir. 1996) (other 
citations and quotations omitted)); see also United States 
Trustee v. Gryphon at the Stone Mansion, Inc., 166 F.3d 
552, 556 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting that test to determine if 
matter is "related to" a bankruptcy is whether the outcome 
of the proceeding could conceivably have any effect on the 
estate being administered in bankruptcy). As we reaffirmed 
in Halper, the key word "is `conceivable.' Certainty, or even 
likelihood [of effect on the estate being administered in 
bankruptcy] is not a requirement." 164 F.3d at 837 
(quoting In re Guild, 72 F.3d at 1181) (other quotations 
omitted). Thus, jurisdiction is a threshold issue determined 
by speculating whether the ultimate outcome of the 
litigation could conceivably affect the bankrupt estate. 
Here, the Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction to hear 
Spirco's, as merged into Innovo, motion to enforce the 
terms of the Bankruptcy Plan of Reorganization because 
resolution of that motion may arguably have had an impact 
on Spirco's bankruptcy. That the underlying issue is 
enforcement of a state court judgment is irrelevant to our 
analysis of the Bankruptcy Court's jurisdiction. 
 
B. Standard of Review 
 
The scope of our review critically depends on the nature 
of the Bankruptcy Court's and the District Court's 
jurisdiction. In a core case, a bankruptcy court can enter a 
final judgment over which a District Court can exercise only 
appellate review. See 28 U.S.C. SS 157(b)(1), 158(a). During 
a non-core proceeding, however, a bankruptcy court can 
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only issue proposed findings and conclusions; the district 
court alone can enter final judgment, and exercise de novo 
review of the bankruptcy court's proposals. See 28 U.S.C. 
S 157(c)(1). In either case, we have appellate jurisdiction 
over the district court's final decision. See 28 U.S.C. 
SS 158(d), 1291. The nature of the bankruptcy and the 
district court's jurisdictions, however, determines whether 
we are reviewing the final decision of the bankruptcy court 
or the district court, i.e., to whose fact-finding we owe 
clear-error deference. See Halper, 164 F.3d at 836 ("[A] 
proceeding's core or non-core nature is crucial in 
bankruptcy cases because it defines both the extent of the 
Bankruptcy Court's jurisdiction, and the standard by which 
the District Court reviews its factual findings."). 
 
A core proceeding, " `invokes a substantive right provided 
by title 11 or . . . by its nature, could arise only in the 
context of a bankruptcy case.' " Id. (quoting In re Guild, 72 
F.3d at 1178). When reviewing a core proceeding, we accept 
the Bankruptcy Court's findings of fact unless clearly 
erroneous. See id. at 835. 
 
In contrast, a non-core proceeding belongs to "the 
broader universe of all proceedings that are not core 
proceedings but are nevertheless `related to' a bankruptcy 
case." Id. at 837. Thus, a "non-core" matter may include a 
proceeding that is not against the debtor or the debtor's 
property. See id. When reviewing a non-core proceeding, we 
treat the district court as the trial court, accepting its 
findings of fact unless clearly erroneous. See  28 U.S.C. 
S 157. Of course, conclusions of law are reviewed de novo 
in both core and non-core proceedings. See id.  
 
The Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania opined that Spirco's motion to enforce the 
terms of the Reorganized Plan and enjoin enforcement of 
the state court judgment against Innovo was a core 
proceeding because "[s]uch a request would arise only in 
the context of a bankruptcy case wherein a plan of 
reorganization was confirmed and debtor had received a 
discharge." Spirco, 201 B.R. at 748. Innovo claims that 
" `[b]ut for' the filing of the Chapter 11 case by `Spirco' and 
the terms of its Plan, `Copelin' would have been free to 
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pursue collection from `Spirco' or `Innovo' or both, until his 
claim was satisfied." Appellants' Br. at 26-27. We disagree. 
 
At issue here is whether Copelin has the right to collect 
his judgment from Innovo, a non-debtor who became 
involved in a bankruptcy court proceeding through the 
confirmation of an Amended Plan. This, we conclude, is a 
non-core proceeding. See Northern Pipeline Construction Co. 
v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 102 S. Ct. 2858 
(1982) (criticizing the exercise of jurisdiction by a non- 
Article III judge over a state law claim that was connected 
to a bankruptcy solely because the plaintiff filed a petition 
for bankruptcy). Indeed, it would be inconsistent with 
Northern Pipeline to require Copelin to have his rights 
determined by a non-Article III court simply because Innovo 
invoked the protection of the bankruptcy court through a 
bankruptcy court procedure. It is clear from the record that 
Copelin sued and won a state court judgment against 
Innovo, not Spirco. Innovo remained a party to the action 
after Copelin filed a notice of non-suit against Spirco 
because Innovo was originally a party to the Employment 
Agreement.2 Additionally, by the very terms of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The Tennessee state court concluded that Spirco was not an 
indispensable party. Tennessee's Rules of Civil Procedure state: 
 
       Rule 19. Joinder of Persons Needed for Just Adjudication. 
 
       19.01 Persons to Be Joined if Feasible. A person subject to the 
       jurisdiction of the court shall be joined as a party if (1) in the 
       person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those 
       already parties, or (2) the person claims an interest relating to 
the 
       subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of 
the 
       action in the person's absence may (i) as a practical matter impair 
       or impede the person's ability to protect that interest, or (ii) 
leave 
       any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of 
       incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations 
by 
       reasons of the claimed interest. If the person has not been so 
joined, 
       the court shall order that the person be made a party. If the 
person 
       properly should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, he or she 
       may be made a defendant, or in a proper case, an involuntary 
       plaintiff. This rule shall be construed to allow joint tort-feasors 
and 
       obligors on obligations that are joint and several to be sued 
either 
       jointly or severally. 
 
Tenn. R. Civ. P. 19.01. 
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Reorganization Plan, Innovo is not the debtor. Copelin's 
judgment resulted from a "garden variety contract claim 
[against Innovo,] and is not against the bankrupt estate." 
Beard v. Braunstein, 914 F.2d 434, 444 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(holding that RICO and state law alter ego and common law 
fraud claims brought against shareholders, officers, 
directors and managing agents of a corporation thatfiled 
bankruptcy were not barred by the bankruptcy court's 
order confirming the Reorganization Plan, in part, because 
"the bankruptcy court would not have had jurisdiction to 
hear [the plaintiff 's] claims against the defendants"). 
Copelin's judgment did not result from a claim filed against 
a debtor that invoked bankruptcy law. Thus, the District 
Court properly concluded, 
 
       the efforts to execute on the judgment are not against 
       the debtor . . . [because] they do not seek to satisfy the 
       state court judgment by obtaining any property of the 
       bankruptcy estate. . . . Copelin's efforts to collect on 
       the judgment do not involve rights created by 
       bankruptcy law, [therefore], the issue before[this 
       court] is not of the type which arises only in the 
       context of a bankruptcy case. 
 
Spirco, 221 B.R. at 367 (citing Beard, 914 F.2d at 444). 
 
We reject Innovo's assertions urging us to hold that a 
non-debtor party who is independently liable on a state 
court judgment may subvert that judgment and invoke core 
treatment from a bankruptcy court simply by assuming 
obligations of a debtor who is also obligated to the same 
creditor. Both the Bankruptcy Court and Innovo 
characterize the issue as "debtor['s] request[ ][of] 
enforcement of the injunction arising from plan 
confirmation against efforts by a pre-petition creditor to 
collect a debt owed to that creditor by debtor and a third 
party." Spirco, 201 B.R. at 749. However, the debt is owed 
only by Innovo, the third party. The fact that Spirco merged 
into Innovo with Innovo as the surviving corporation does 
not does not change our analysis. 
 
The proceeding was non-core, therefore, the Bankruptcy 
Court's jurisdiction arose under 28 U.S.C. S 157(c)(1), and 
we exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. As such, 
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the Bankruptcy Court's findings and conclusions are mere 
recommendations entitled to no deference, and the District 
Court's findings of fact are subject to review for clear error. 
 
C. Is Copelin's Claim Against Innovo a 
       Class 8 Claim Under the Terms of the Plan and 
       the Bankruptcy Court Order? 
 
We also reject Innovo's assertion that the language and 
terms of the Reorganization Plan included Copelin's state 
court judgment against Innovo. First, the terms of the 
Reorganization Plan and the Bankruptcy Court Order dated 
November 18, 1994, expressly limits the discharge of 
Innovo's liability. See, e.g., Art. II(H) ("Class 8 consists of 
holders of Allowed General Unsecured Claims upon which 
[Innovo] is liable, by guaranty or otherwise, as established 
by (a) the entry of a Final Order upon motion filed by 
Debtor or Class 8 Claimant, or (b) written acknowledgment 
of [Innovo]."); Art. III ("Innovo shall acquire all assets and 
powers belonging to the Debtor but shall incur liability of 
[Spirco] only as provided for in this Plan."); Art. X(C) ("At no 
time shall [Innovo] be deemed a debtor. [Innovo] shall incur 
no obligations as a result of such merger except as 
specifically provided in the Plan."); Art. X(D)("Upon the 
Effective Date, [Spirco] shall receive a discharge pursuant 
to Section 1141 of the Bankruptcy Code. The discharge of 
[Spirco] shall also effect a discharge of[Innovo with] respect 
to all claims and interests against Spirco, Inc."). 
 
Importantly, although the Bankruptcy Court classified 
Copelin's claim as a Class 8 claim, the express terms of the 
Order do not encompass Innovo's independent liability to 
Copelin. The Order of the Court dated November 8, 1994, 
states in relevant part: 
 
       1. Each of the named Respondents herein have 
       initiated Litigation against Innovo Group, Inc. in an 
       effort to establish Innovo Group, Inc. liability[sic] for 
       [Spirco's] obligations to such Respondents; 
 
       2. Each of the named Respondents herein shall be 
       and are deemed to be holders of Disputed Class 8 
       claims against [Spirco] as provided in the confirmed 
       Plan of Reorganization; 
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       3. In the event that Respondents, or any one of them, 
       obtain a final Order of Court in the aforesaid Litigation 
       establishing Innovo group, Inc. liability [sic] for the 
       Debtors obligations, then such Respondent shall be 
       deemed to have an Allowed Class 8 claim payable 
       pursuant to the terms of the confirmed Plan of 
       Reorganization. 
 
Appellants' App. at 193-94. The plain language in the 
Reorganization Plan and the Order classifying claims 
reveals that judgments entered against Innovo individually, 
without reference to Spirco's liability, do not fall within any 
of these provisions. 
 
Second, the Tennessee state judgment does not indicate 
that Innovo's liability was contingent on Spirco's liability. 
The Bankruptcy Court's faulty analysis is evident in its 
characterization of Spirco's motion to enforce the terms of 
the Reorganization Plan. The Bankruptcy Court premised 
its decision on the statement that "debtor Spirco, Inc. has 
moved for an order enforcing the provision of its confirmed 
plan of reorganization which prohibits respondent Wayne 
Copelin from continuing his efforts in another forum to 
collect from Innovo Group, Inc. on a pre-petition debt owed 
by debtor and guaranteed by Innovo." Spirco, 201 B.R. at 
746. The Tennessee state court, however, found that Innovo 
was independently liable, not liable as a guarantor.3 
 
Because Spirco's Reorganization Plan and the 
classification of claims by their terms do not apply to 
Copelin's state court judgment against Innovo, Stoll v. 
Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 59 S. Ct. 83 (1938), Chicot County 
Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 60 S. 
Ct. 317 (1940), and In re Szostek, 886 F.2d 1405, 1408-10 
(3d Cir. 1989), are not controlling. As explained, the 
Reorganization Plan expressly limits the discharge of 
Innovo's obligations to those "claims and interest against 
Spirco" "upon which [Innovo] is liable by guaranty or 
otherwise, as established by (a) the entry of afinal Order 
upon motion filed by Debtor or Class 8 Claimant, or (b) 
written acknowledgment of [Innovo]." Appellants' App. at 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Innovo concedes that the Tennessee state court found Innovo 
separately liable to Copelin. 
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65, Article II(H); Appellee's App. at 23, Article X(D). There is 
no indication that Innovo's liability on the Tennessee state 
court judgment arises from either of these two situations. 
Moreover, the Reorganization Plan makes it clear that 
despite the merger of Spirco and Innovo, Innovo is not the 
debtor; therefore, Innovo's protections under Spirco's 
Reorganization Plan are limited. Appellee's App. at 23, 
Article X(C); Article X(D). 
 
Finally, reading the plan to allow a general discharge of 
Innovo is incorrect. Generally, independent obligations of a 
parent corporation are not discharged by its subsidiary's 
bankruptcy absent a general discharge provision. To the 
contrary, the general rule of First Fidelity Bank v. McAteer, 
985 F.2d 114 (3d Cir. 1993), controls. In McAteer, we said: 
 
       While it is true that the bankruptcy court's 
       confirmation of the amended plan binds the debtor and 
       all creditors vis-a-vis the debtor, it does not follow that 
       a discharge in bankruptcy alters the right of the 
       creditor to collect from third parties. Section 524(e) 
       specifically limits the effect of a discharge. It provides 
       that ". . . discharge of a debt of the debtor does not 
       affect the liability of any other entity on, or the 
       property of any other entity for, such debt." This 
       section assures creditors that the discharge of a debtor 
       will not preclude them from collecting the full amount 
       of a debt from co-debtors or other liable parties. 
 
Id. at 118 (quoting 11 U.S.C. S 524(e)) (emphasis added). 
 
In sum, the District Court did not err by determining that 
Copelin's claim against Innovo does not qualify as a Class 
8 claim. There is no evidence that Innovo's liability on the 
Employment Agreement is contingent on Spirco's liability. 
Further, the release provision is limited in scope. When 
read in context with other provisions of the plan, it is clear 
that this discharge provision is limited to those claims and 
obligations upon which Innovo's liability results from 
"claims and interest against Spirco" or Innovo's status as 
"guaranty or otherwise, as established by (a) the entry of a 
final Order upon motion filed by Debtor or Class 8 
Claimant, or (b) written acknowledgment of [Innovo]." 
Appellants' App. at 65; Appellee's App. at 23. We hold that 
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the state court judgment rendered against Innovo does not 
fall within the plain terms of Spirco's Plan of 
Reorganization. We will affirm the District Court's denial of 
Spirco's motion to enjoin Copelin's enforcement of the state 
court judgment.4 
 
III. 
 
In conclusion, Copelin holds a judgment against Innovo 
for breach of contract, breach of the covenants of good faith 
and fair dealing, and promissory estoppel. The District 
Court correctly decided that Copelin's judgment against 
Innovo does not fall within the terms of either the 
Reorganization Plan or the Bankruptcy Court's order that 
any final order establishing Innovo's liability for Spirco's 
obligations be classified as an Allowed Class 8 claim. 
Therefore, we affirm. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Because we affirm the District Court, we need not address Copelin's 
other arguments. 
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